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RESEARCH & DEBATE

THE KEY TO MIDWAY CORAL SEA AND A CULTURE OF LEARNING

Carl Cavanagh Hodge

Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War College Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the
scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether
one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at
the hands of the U.S. Navy.1 Levy observes that an assumption common to many
works is “that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the Americans did
to win it, or more.”2 He takes issue with “cultural” explanations for the outcome
of 4 June 1942, specifically the extent to which Japanese war strategy and naval
doctrine were descendants of Oriental philosophy and the children of a culture
that valued conformity and obedience over creativity and personal initiative.
Levy rightly concludes that American “diligence” more than any other single factor contributed to the total destruction of the Japanese carrier fleet sent against
Midway.3
Levy devotes special attention to Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully’s book
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, a work whose scholarly
thoroughness he lauds yet one he simultaneously indicts for an obsession with
debunking myths about Midway and with demonstrating that its outcome was to
be found in Japanese practice and doctrine.4 In the
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direction of the Pacific War within six months of its opening gambit at Pearl
Harbor. In a careful reading of both engagements, the battle of Midway and the
battle of the Coral Sea, one is struck by those specific qualities of the U.S. Navy
that in the first six months of the Pacific War made it especially ripe for a major
victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).
Admittedly, Parshall and Tully level many substantive criticisms against the established scholarly myths about Midway and trace much of the IJN’s thought and
action to systemic factors derived as much from a way of life as from the practical
challenges of modern naval warfare. Yet in this they are in the good company of
other works, such as Kaigun, by David Evans and Mark Peattie, that locate much
of the spirit of Japanese early naval thought in the mystical bent of Akiyama
Saneyuki, whose most baleful impact on the IJN of World War II was, ironically,
a Mahanian faith in decisive battle that the U.S. Navy no longer shared.5 In Levy’s
effort to make the case for American diligence in preparation for Midway, however, Levy himself fails to pay sufficient attention to a factor appropriately stressed
by Parshall and Tully in the introduction and conclusion of their analysis, one
that cannot be excluded from any responsible treatment of Midway—the learning culture developed in the white heat of conflict between the battle of the Coral
Sea and the battle of Midway. The U.S. Navy’s greatest triumph was the product
less of Japanese cultural pathologies than of the intellectual profit the Americans
gained from the lesser engagement only a month before. For Parshall and Tully,
Coral Sea was in many respects the overture to the opera, so much so that what
happened at Midway is not wholly comprehensible without an understanding of
the outcome of the earlier engagement, as well as of the American and Japanese
reactions to it. Any study of Midway ought to acknowledge that the limited encounter of the first instance that exerted decision influence on the main event of
the second is not unlike the relationship of the battle of Ligny to Waterloo.
All histories of Midway, of course, acknowledge up front the enormous contribution of the code breakers at Pearl Harbor in giving the U.S. Navy actionable
information on the movements of Japanese task forces in the Pacific, along with
coherent calculations of the intentions behind them. In the early months of 1942
the U.S. Navy had an emerging image of the overall operational situation in the
central and western Pacific, and in the weeks leading up to Midway it was also
able to sketch a plausible tactical picture of the coming clash with the IJN. As this
knowledge evolved, changes to command structure were also made, the better
to integrate intelligence with command. Whereas Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
sailed with the Japanese Combined Fleet to Midway, which is consistent with the
custom of decentralized command common to all navies of the time, Admiral
Chester Nimitz remained at Pearl Harbor to orchestrate the U.S. Navy’s response
to the Midway attack. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch note in their study of failure
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in war that “Nimitz’s behavior at Midway suggests that the U.S. Navy did not simply refuse to change its traditional attitudes to command, painful as that might
prove.”6 Yamamoto’s preference for sticking with what he assumed to be the triedand-true meant that he had all the foggier notion of what awaited him at Midway.
What awaited him, however, had to a significant extent been determined by
the outcome of the Coral Sea battle only a month earlier and by the determination of the U.S. Navy to make the most of both the material balance of forces
following that battle, and the lessons learned in its prosecution. The battle of the
Coral Sea, the first-ever clash of aircraft-carrier fleets, had been occasioned by
Japan’s efforts in the first stage of the Pacific War to establish a chain of air bases
across the southwest Pacific and to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of
New Guinea, to maintain access to the Coral Sea and any potential targets in
northeast Australia. These plans were short-circuited by the U.S. Navy’s Task
Force (TF) 17, commanded by Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher. On 7 and 8 May 1942,
attacks by Fletcher’s aircraft mauled the Japanese invasion in its opening phase
sufficiently to force the postponement of any follow-through on the larger plan.
Thus although the Coral Sea fight was a marginal tactical victory for the IJN, in
terms of ships and tonnage sunk, it amounted to a small strategic triumph for
the U.S. Navy.
However, the material knock-on effects of the Coral Sea conflict were highly
significant. At the beginning of 1942 the IJN had a quantitative edge over the
U.S. Navy’s carrier force. Japan had six fleet carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, Sōryū,
Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. In addition, the light carriers Hōshō, Ryujo, Shōhō, and
Zuihō were available to support operations of the fleet carriers. The United
States had five fleet carriers available for operations in the Pacific. The design
and capabilities across all classes varied enormously; USS Lexington (CV 2) and
USS Saratoga (CV 3) were converted cruisers dating to the 1920s, whereas USS
Yorktown (CV 5), USS Enterprise (CV 6), and USS Hornet (CV 8) were the first
genuinely modern fleet carriers. At Coral Sea, Japanese aircraft were able to sink
Lexington and inflict serious damage to Yorktown. In return American aircraft
destroyed Shōhō.
Parshall and Tully, as well as Craig Symonds in his book on Midway, note that
the overall material damage rendered at Coral Sea to the IJN’s fighting capacity
went well beyond the ships sunk outright. Although Shōhō’s loss was hardly a
body blow, the damage to the fleet carrier Shōkaku was sufficient to strike it from
the roster for the Midway operation, and Zuikaku was withdrawn as well, owing
entirely to aircraft losses. In this instance a factor intervened in the aftermath of
Coral Sea that might be deemed “cultural” but that was, strictly speaking, organizational in nature. Parshall and Tully point out that the IJN could have attempted
to reconstitute Zuikaku’s air wing in time for Midway but that such a change
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would have violated an organizational custom that married Japanese air units to
specific carriers. If either a ship or its air wing were not in condition for operations, both were withdrawn. So Coral Sea took one light IJN carrier, Shōhō, out
of action permanently, while two heavy carriers slated for the attack on Midway,
Shōkaku and Zuikaku, would not be there.7 The IJN decided to take four, not six,
carriers to its showdown at Midway.
Furthermore, before Coral Sea the Japanese had a wide edge over the U.S.
Navy in experienced pilots. At Coral Sea they lost many of their best pilots, while
their comparatively green American adversaries gained valuable experience in
the art of attacking Japanese carriers.8 What Fletcher’s force achieved at Coral
Sea, therefore, amounted to much more than a short-term check to Japanese
strategic plans; it seriously compromised the total strength the IJN could bring
to bear against the American carriers at Midway. Paul Dull, in his battle history
of the IJN, wonders whether these losses alone might have deprived Japan of the
smashing victory at Midway.9
Even if one sets aside such speculation, Coral Sea was at the very least an installment on a future defeat. If a cornerstone of Japanese strategic doctrine was
to employ overwhelming force and advantage of numbers, Coral Sea sharply
reduced that advantage; “if an objective wasn’t important enough to require
sending all six carriers,” Parshall and Tully remind us, “it wasn’t worth going
after at all,” so that “Japan paid the ultimate price for her violation a month later
at Midway.”10
That the price at Midway turned out to be so high was the U.S. Navy’s achievement, both in making the most of the strategic opportunity that sound intelligence afforded it and in drawing tactical lessons from Coral Sea to maximize the
dividend offered by the opportunity at hand. The effect of the IJN’s decision to
scratch off two carriers from the Midway operation following Coral Sea was compounded by the U.S. Navy’s extraordinary efforts to ensure that Yorktown, badly
damaged but able to escape destruction, would be repaired and refitted in time
to rejoin the hostilities. Whereas under normal circumstances Yorktown would
have required three months to refit, Admiral Nimitz gave the 1,400 fabricators,
shipfitters, and welders at the dry-dock facility at Pearl Harbor less than three
days of around-the-clock labor in which to patch and replace what they could.
The effort drew so much electrical power that some districts of Honolulu suffered outages. Symonds stresses that “whereas Yamamoto assumed that the loss
of Shōkaku and Zuikaku only narrowed the Kido Butai’s [carrier force’s] margin
of superiority, Nimitz knew that if the Americans were to have any chance against
the oncoming juggernaut, they would need all three of their carriers.”11 By using
the available intelligence to contrive an ambush of the Japanese force in Midway’s
proximity, he improved the odds further. Along with Enterprise and Hornet, the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/8
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presence of Yorktown plus the use of the airstrip on Midway Island would give
Nimitz four platforms from which to launch aircraft—parity with the Japanese
force that at no other time and place in the opening months of the war in the
Pacific had been possible.
Meanwhile, the Japanese command assumed that Coral Sea had put both Lexington and Yorktown out of action. Whether or not one indicts “victory disease”
for the overconfidence in proceeding with the Midway operation, the casualness
with which the IJN reduced by a third the forces it intended to employ stands in
stark contrast to American effort to retrieve Yorktown from near death to fighting fitness. It is important to underscore, moreover, that Yorktown’s presence
at Midway was valuable far beyond the mathematical balance of carriers. Specifically, the experience of Yorktown’s aviators at Midway sharpened American
air-strike capabilities significantly. John Lundstrom’s study of naval air combat
in the Pacific notes that Coral Sea was the first acid test of American naval carrier doctrine. Although there was little time between the Coral Sea and Midway
engagements to study and apply the lessons of the former for systematic application to the latter, “the Yorktown aviators were the only ones in a position to profit
from their hard-earned Coral Sea experiences, and their excellent performance
at Midway demonstrated the value of those lessons.”12 At Coral Sea, American
naval fighter pilots had been introduced to the storied A6M Zero fighter, and
they had appreciated the remarkable maneuverability of the Japanese fighter
while learning that their own F4F-3 Wildcats were its equal in speed and climbing ability and its superior in firepower and protection.13 Although Yorktown’s air
group was reorganized prior to Midway—both to facilitate an increase in overall
fighter strength in time for Midway and to integrate the new F4F-4 folding-wing
Wildcats into its numbers—leaders such as Lieutenant John S. (“Jimmy”) Thach
listened to the accounts of Yorktown’s flyers of their Coral Sea experiences. A
hastily innovated version of the “Thach Weave” beam-defense position debuted
at Midway under the most challenging circumstances and was remarkably effective in meeting Japanese fighter attacks.14 So, not only was Yorktown available
for action northwest of Midway Atoll on 4 June 1942, but the experience that its
aviators acquired at Coral Sea was integrated into the Midway force through the
American mix-and-match approach to carriers and air wings, an approach from
which the IJN abstained.
There is no need to engage in discussions of cultural contrasts between
American and Japanese naval traditions or to work over the latter for real or
imagined strategic pathologies to acknowledge that the United States brought
organizational flexibility to the engagement and extracted every ounce of innovative energy in its determination to prevail. Levy’s stress on American diligence is
wholly in harmony with Parshall and Tully’s observations that with the overnight
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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refitting of Yorktown the U.S. Navy was already benefiting from superior organizational practices before the trial of strength at Midway.15 In addition, it mattered
a great deal not only that the U.S. Navy was to have a third carrier for Midway
but that Admiral Nimitz gave tactical command of the two task forces (TF 16,
with Enterprise and Hornet, and TF 17, with Yorktown), joined for the ambush
of the Japanese force closing on Midway, to Fletcher—together, a commander
and ships with more experience in combat with Japanese carriers than any other
combination available.
Owing to combat experience of Coral Sea battle and the efficient launch of
torpedo planes, fighters, and dive-bombers of Yorktown’s air group, Fletcher’s
team was the only force to arrive over its target almost exactly according to navigational calculation to deliver a timely and coordinated attack. Torpedo bombers
were launched first, followed by dive-bombers, and then, in turn, the fighters.
The objective of this procedure, that the three groups would rendezvous before
encountering the Japanese, involved a quantum of risk, but Yorktown had already
rehearsed en route with considerable success at Coral Sea. Other American carrier aircraft formations at Midway flew in small groups and became separated,
but Yorktown’s remained closely coordinated, “with each of the tactical elements
remaining in sight of each other up until the time they initiated their attack.”16
Because Yorktown’s dive-bombers, to their own amazement, came upon the Japanese carrier Sōryū without the cover of any combat air patrol (CAP), their attack
was devastating. Seventeen SBD Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers, under Lieutenant Commander Maxwell Leslie, scored three hits on Sōryū with thousandpound bombs, destroying its flight deck and gutting its hangar below.
In combination with the destruction of Akagi and Kaga by the dive-bombers
of TF 16, the IJN lost three of its four carriers (and the battle of Midway) in
scarcely more than five minutes of action.17 Because dive-bombers from Enterprise had initially been unable to locate the Japanese carriers and had arrived
over them from the southwest almost at the same time as Leslie’s strike force arrived from the east, the Japanese carriers were caught from two directions at the
moment of maximum vulnerability, when their flight decks were covered with
aircraft preparing for launch. Not only did the U.S. Navy air groups approach
from separate axes at approximately the same time, but they came in at high and
low altitudes, presenting the Japanese air defenses with a challenge beyond their
capability. Although coincidence accounted for this (what Parshall and Tully call
“a healthy dollop of bad luck”), the impression among the Japanese that the U.S.
Navy had such accurate knowledge of their position that it could synchronize
attacks from different directions must have been psychologically devastating.18 It
was certainly materially catastrophic.
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Other factors, then, contributed directly or indirectly to the scale of the
American triumph. Among them were the improvements made to the U.S. Navy’s
combat air patrol, based in part on the failure of American fighters at Coral Sea
to break up Japanese strike forces before they could close in on the American
carriers. Fighter direction and CAP at Midway were more effective (Task Force
16 escaped attack entirely) when the idea of a layered CAP, aircraft operating at
different altitudes, was applied to carrier defense. Even after Midway, American
CAP required further development, principally through multicarrier task forces
with highly integrated CAPs, but the effort to learn and adapt from recent experience was very much in evidence among the American fighters on 4 June 1942.
By contrast, the IJN’s CAP did not improve significantly between Coral Sea and
Midway and did little to compensate for Yamamoto’s misty appreciation of his
enemy’s dispositions around Midway. Admittedly, Japanese pilots had to operate
without the early-warning capabilities of radar; still, as Parshall and Tully point
out, relatively simple tactical improvements could have improved the defense of
the IJN’s carriers.19 One cannot help but be struck by the fact that the IJN’s CAP
in no way compensated at the tactical level for Japan’s inferior operational intelligence, so that the ambush effect hoped for by the U.S. Navy’s command unfolded
largely as planned.
The limitations of the damage-control practices on board Japanese carriers,
meanwhile, ensured that once the American dive-bombers scored major hits,
the chances of recovering operational effectiveness diminished quickly. We have
here another instance of contrast with the learning culture of the U.S. Navy following Coral Sea. It was at Coral Sea that Oscar Myers, Yorktown’s Air Department fuel officer, realized that among the factors that sealed the unhappy fate of
Lexington was the presence of aviation fuel on its hangar deck. Because the U.S.
Navy thereafter drained fuel systems after usage and filled the lines with CO2,
Yorktown was spared the ravages of a runaway fire when it absorbed a major Japanese dive-bomber assault. The patched-up Yorktown was actually more resilient
under attack at Midway; the carrier that had contributed so much to the U.S.
Navy’s heroic struggle in 1942 ultimately succumbed not to bombs but to torpedoes. Fifteen aircraft from Yorktown’s bombing group were able to participate
in the retaliatory strike from Enterprise that began the destruction of Hiryū, the
fourth and last IJN carrier at Midway.20 Lastly, the extraordinary performance of
the U.S. Navy’s torpedo bombers and dive-bombers must be noted—the former
sacrificed in the battle’s opening phase to annihilating attacks from Japanese
fighters while the latter delivered the fatal blows to the IJN’s carriers when there
were comparatively fewer Japanese fighters to meet them. Indeed, Yorktown’s
third bombing group was unruffled by fighters during or after its attack. After
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initial misses, the American dive-bomber pilots settled into a rhythm of multiple
hits with five-hundred-pound and thousand-pound bombs on such vital parts of
the Japanese carriers that even appropriate damage control would have been hard
pressed to save them.
Above all, it is Levy’s point about diligence (a point not missed, and indeed
stressed, by Parshall and Tully) that needs to be underscored. A culture of learning, arising from experience rather than theory and shared in the weeks between
Coral Sea and Midway at every level of the U.S. Navy’s carrier task forces, meant
that ultimately victory was earned by the Americans rather than thrown away
by the Japanese. Levy is right to conclude that military historians are too quick
to apportion blame. An almost perverse fascination with failure often seems
to mark qualification for the profession. I do not share his aversion to cultural
explanations for behavior in battle any more than I share the attraction of others to such explanations. Cultural factors are simply harder to measure and less
satisfying as an explanation than is a careful reconstruction of what actually happened. I do share Levy’s enthusiasm for Eric Grove’s scholarship on the Philippine Sea, and I recommend that his stress on technology and training be applied
to Midway, along with emphasis on the extraordinary application of hard-won
knowledge in evidence in the U.S. Navy in the early months of the Pacific War.21
This knowledge was remarkably on duty at all levels: Chester Nimitz’s courage
in acting on the intelligence in his possession, to toss the iron dice on a fight as
big and potentially disastrous as Midway, was complemented by the decisions
of Fletcher and Spruance (in a knife-edge balance of prudence with bravery)
to launch air strikes before they had perfect knowledge of the enemy’s position
and intentions. Their commitment to tactical conviction, however, was in turn
redeemed by the tenacity, skill, and personal sacrifice of the U.S. Navy’s bombers,
scout planes, and F4F pilots in delivering a staggering blow to Japanese carrierborne airpower. John Keegan points out that for Midway, American cryptanalysts
provided a picture “as clear as the obscurities of war will ever allow” but that a
little less intuition by the pilots engaged to act on it might have compromised that
advantage.22 Happily, the recent experience of Coral Sea in aerial reconnaissance,
tactics of aerial combat, and techniques of dive-bombing made that intuition
especially acute. Whereas the years between 1909 and 1941 witnessed the rise of
Japanese naval airpower, the spring of 1942 marked the beginning of its sudden
and steep decline.23
Nothing in the actions of the U.S. Navy indicates that its personnel believed
God was on their side at Midway and so all would simply be well; to the contrary,
every fiber of arm, heart, and brain was applied to narrowing the advantage of
a foe who had hitherto seemed invincible. If there was a “miracle” at work at
Midway, then surely it was that the U.S. Navy, at every level, drew all the right
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/8
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conclusions from one engagement for application to the next. Any familiarity
with military history teaches us that this virtue is so rare as to tempt the conclusion that, if not the Almighty, then surely Sweet Reason intervened wholly to the
benefit of one side.
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